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PRIVATISING AGRICULTURAL R&D, AN EXAMPLE FROM 
THE SOUTH AFRICAN SUGAR INDUSTRY  
 






Given demands on public funding, the question arises whether agricultural research 
should be the responsibility of the public or private sectors, or whether the state should 
play a facilitating role. These issues are studied using the management and success of 
R&D in the South African Sugar Industry as an example. The usual answer is that 
research should be publicly funded if it is a public good and privately funded if a private 
good. It is shown that even if aspects of research have clear public good characteristics, 
then it is still possible to internalise externalities. Sugar cane farmers pay a levy of about 
1.0% of the value of the crop to finance their R&D package, which includes research, 
training and extension. The sugar growers decide on the amount of the levy themselves. A 
possible reason why sugar farmers agree to this levy is that a bottom-up multidisciplinary 
research programme is followed in which they have a direct say. Scientists from different 
disciplines work together on a single crop. The South African government should consider  
the Dutch example where the role of government has shifted from administrator of 
institutions to stimulator (sponsor) of research. Government should thus still play a critical 
role in R&D funding in South Africa and there is concern that State funding has declined. 
Private incentives for research may be weaker in the case of generic research with broad 
applications across commodities. However, in the latter case it will be expected that different 




The majority of people in South Africa are poor. The production of safe and 
nutritious food at affordable prices is therefore a national objective. Investment in 
agricultural research and development (R&D) is consequently essential in order 
to improve agriculture's productive capacity. However, with severe demands on 
public funding, the question arises whether agricultural research should be the 
responsibility of the public or private sectors, or whether the state should play a 
facilitating role. 
 
Whether research can be privatised raises issues such as public versus private 
goods, spillovers and welfare redistributional aspects. For instance, will the 
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private sector under-invest in agricultural R&D?  Even if aspects of research have 
clear public good characteristics, then it is still possible to internalise externalities. 
These issues are studied using the management and success of R&D in the South 
African Sugar Industry as an example. In this Industry, R&D is financed through 
levies. The desirability of extending this research programme to other 
agricultural industries is explored. 
 
2. THEORETICAL  CONSIDERATIONS 
 
2.1  Public goods, private goods and R&D  
 
Public goods are characterised by two criteria, namely nonrivalness and 
nonexcludability. Nonrivalness means that the satisfaction one consumer receives 
from a good, does not detract from the enjoyment derived by others. The use of 
agricultural R&D by one farmer does not preclude others from benefiting from it. 
Agricultural research thus generally meets the nonrivalness criterion. 
 
Nonexcludability states that if a public good is provided to one individual, 
additional consumers cannot be excluded from the benefit of the good through 
fees (Pasour, 1990). The extent to which exclusion is feasible depends partly on 
whether it is a basic science, applied science or the development of technology 
and its concurrent extension to users. Basic research is often published in 
scientific journals accessible to everyone. Aspects of basic research can be 
characterised as a public good if both above-mentioned criteria are being met. In 
the Netherlands, UK and USA, government funded agricultural R&D has been 
redirected towards a heavier emphasis on basic research (Alston et al, 1999:278). 
 
Investment in public goods may be sub optimum, due to spillovers, as the 
benefits are captured by others rather than the innovator and therefore private 
research may be under funded (Ruttan, 1982). However, Pasour (1990) questions 
the spillover rationale arguing that spillovers often arise in the economy, which 
does not imply a role for government. This public good rationale is less valid as 
one moves from the basic sciences to the development of new technology. 
Developers of new technology in agriculture can often capture returns from their 
investments through copyrights, patents and fees. A new plant variety or 
machine can be patented, printed information can be copyrighted, admission fees 
can be charged for information etc. 
 
If research does not meet both criteria, then there is no reason why private 
investment will be sub-optimum. In areas where the private sector is involved 
such as developing new varieties, the competition from the public sector may be 
seen as unfair. 
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Thirtle and Echeverría (1994) suggest that the level of public intervention 
depends on the type of research and that few research activities can be classified 
as purely public or purely private. This implies that the split between public and 
private research has several dimensions and that efficient institutional 
arrangements will be specific to a particular activity. Technical innovations, such 
as in the field of biotechnology, may move the boundary towards increased 
private activity, but public and private contributions should be viewed as 
complementary rather than substitutes (Thirtle & Echeverría, 1994). 
 
Persley (1998:283) states that public sector R&D is decreasing worldwide and that 
it is partially offset by increasing private sector investments. Private sector 
investments have continued to grow and have surpassed public sector 
investments for developed nations (Huffman & Just, 1999). In general, private 
sector investment in the developed world is estimated to account for half of the 
agricultural research expenditures (James, 2002). For developing countries, 
private sector investments are generally lower than public sector investments and 
although growing, account for only 10-15% of total agricultural R&D 
expenditures (World Bank, 2002). The low level of agricultural R&D expenditure 
by the private sector in developing countries infers scope for increased 
investment. Recent data show that private sector investments in agricultural R&D 
in some developing countries are increasing faster than public sector investments. 
This trend is stimulated by the introduction of policies to encourage increased 
private sector participation by the most advanced developing countries (James, 
1996). Alston et al (1999:276) state that public funding has shifted away from 
traditional productivity enhancing research areas toward new research agendas 
such as environment, natural resources, human nutrition and food safety. 
 
2.2  Externalities and research 
 
Private provision of R&D may be sub-optimum if the gain from research is 
captured by others. As technological advances have lowered food prices 
consumers are major beneficiaries and free riders. However, government 
provision of research may create forced riders. 
 
The theory of bureaucracy holds that there is a tendency for public sector services 
to be over supplied. The reasons are the separation of power and information 
(information problem) and separation of power and responsibility (incentive 
problem). The government agricultural research organisation cannot acquire 
information on individual preferences and production opportunities to determine 
research expenditure in the public interest (information problem). Furthermore, 
expected profits and losses do not provide the driving force for investment in a 
government department R&D unit (incentive problem).  
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2.3  Beneficiaries and welfare redistribution 
 
Consumers are main beneficiaries as increased productivity translates into lower 
consumer prices. How consumers are affected depends upon the product in 
question. In the case of export products, additional production leads to greater 
exports and the landowners are main beneficiaries. However, consumers may 
still benefit even if the product is exported. Agricultural import prices for many 
export products are higher than domestic prices, for instance fruit and maize, due 
to distant destinations and high transport cost. Exceptions are sugar (from 
Swaziland), meat, wheat etc. In the case of maize, the import landed price 
exceeds the local domestic price. Maize research thus benefits local consumers of 
maize as well as consumers of livestock products such as broilers. Maize p.c. 
consumption of low income groups is higher than for other groups and the very 
poor benefit from increased maize production, provided markets are free to 
translate increased production into lower prices. 
 
In the case of export fruit crops, an increase in local production through 
technology may lead to an increase in local sales and lower local prices, as an 
almost fixed percentage of local crops do not meet export requirements (Gay & 
Nieuwoudt, 2000). South African consumers are thus major beneficiaries of R&D 
in the fruit sector. Labour may benefit relatively less as economic theory suggests 
that the demand for labour in both subsistence and commercial agriculture is 
elastic in Southern Africa (Nieuwoudt & Vink, 1989).  The supply elasticity of 
land is inelastic and this input captures the rent. The supply of labour in South 
Africa is expected to be elastic due to high rural unemployment and 
unspecialised nature of unskilled labour. An increase in demand for labour as a 
result of technological innovations is thus not expected to increase wages, but it 
may lead to higher employment. Higher yields will increase the demand for all 
inputs such as labour and machinery. Different areas differ and in the labour 
intensive fruit growing areas of the Cape, labour may be more of a constraint. 
 
Research may have welfare implications on the following groups: 
•  consumers versus producers; 
•  small versus large scale farmers; 
•  early versus late adopters of research; 
•  poor versus wealthy consumers; 
•  land owners versus labour, etc; and 
•  importers versus exporters. 
 
Some technology is more appropriate to large than small-scale farmers such as 
certain mechanical operations. Other types of technology benefit both, such as 
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hybrid seed. Early adopters benefit as profits of innovators increase. After the 
innovation is widely adopted, product prices may decline. It is possible that 
larger farmers are the earlier adopters, as they may have a greater incentive to 
adopt technologies (benefits a larger output) than small-scale part time farmers. 
 
Food consumption p.c. for different products differs amongst population groups. 
For instance, consumption p.c. of dairy products, eggs, pig meat and fruit is high 
for high income groups, while p.c. consumption of maize (white) is high for low 
income groups. Some products are consumed by the wealthier and some more by 
the poor. 
 
Some innovations may be labour replacing, such as some chemicals and 
mechanical innovations. The benefits and welfare redistribution of agricultural 
R&D must be seen in terms of the shadow prices of benefits (import price if 
commodity is imported and export price if exported). Welfare redistributional 
impacts of technologies are complex as some groups may be affected in an 
indirect way. 
 
2.4  Theoretical and practical advantages/disadvantages of public/private 
research 
 
Arrow (1962) contends that the private sector under-invest for three reasons: 
inappropriability (public good argument), uncertainty (investors are risk averse) 
and indivisibility (high fixed cost). In reply to Arrow (1962), Demsetz (1969) 
argued that the market failure situation is a necessary but not sufficient condition 
for government intervention. Government failure may be more of a problem than 
‘market failure’. Examples of the latter are the over-staffing of public institutions 
and the inability of public institutions to hold qualified staff due to lack of 
incentives. Further, linkages between researchers and farmers are weak while 
researchers are not responsive to clients' needs (Demsetz, 1969). However, the 
potential of market failure as a consequence of underinvestment in research, 
relative to the socially optimal level, is an important justification for public 
agricultural research in issues with limited incentive for the private sector (Sonka 
& Pueppke, 2002). It may be argued that if research becomes too demand-
oriented, that the research agenda may neglect broader societal and 
environmental issues (Tabor et al, 1998:140). 
 
2.5  Public and Private Sector Roles 
 
The roles of private and public sectors in agricultural research differ with respect 
to objectives, areas of research and types of technology. 
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2.5.1  Differences in objectives 
 
The private sector, driven by a profit motive, may under-invest in development 
projects such as poverty alleviation. The question is thus (a) what can the private 
sector do better or as well as the public sector and (b) what can the private sector 
be encouraged to do. 
 
2.5.2  Area of research and type of technology 
 
Research is a continuum process of activities with basic scientific research at one 
end followed by applied research with product development at the other end. 
The boundary between private/public research depends not only on the basic or 
applied nature of the research, but also on the research area, as mechanical 
innovations are usually more privately undertaken than biological R&D. 
 
The role of private and public sectors vary between technological areas as they 
differ in patent enforceability, economic life and the ability of rivals to imitate 
(Rauser  et al, 1981). Thirtle and Echeverría (1994) suggest that basic agronomic 
R&D falls in the public category, while product development of mechanical 
innovations should be left to the private sector. 
 
2.5.2.1 Mechanical  technology 
Gains from innovations are embodied in technology and benefits are derived from 
the sale of machines. Patents are fairly straightforward for machinery technology 
and R&D can often be left to the private sector (Thirtle & Echeverría, 1994). 
 
2.5.2.2 Chemical  technology 
As in the case of machinery technology, the private sector dominates, although 
public intervention is necessary with regulatory procedures (Thirtle & Echeverría, 
1994). 
 
2.5.2.3 Biological  technology 
Patenting is more difficult than with mechanical and chemical technology. Some 
crops such as wheat, millet, cowpeas and groundnuts can reproduce themselves 
with little genetic variation and it is thus not profitable for private seed 
companies to invest in the breeding, production and marketing of varietal crops, 
because farmers do not have to purchase seed every year to maintain genetic 
purity (Rusike, 1995). By contrast, maize hybrid seed must be purchased every 
year, the parent lines can be kept secret and R&D investment can be recovered 
from royalties. In the USA the public sector tends to produce plant breeding 
material, while the private sector develops the final product (Evenson, 1982 as 
reported in Thirtle & Echeverría, 1994). 
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2.5.2.4  Managerial (agronomic) technology 
Agronomic research includes dates of planting, planting density, spray regimes 
and weeding densities. Ownership is difficult to establish, which limits private 
sector activity. 
 
2.5.2.5 Economic  research 
Economic research on institutions, such as private/communal tenure is a public 
activity, compared to activities with a clear private gain. 
 
Private sector incentives to undertake research will be weak where: (a) the lag 
between R&D investment and returns is long; (b) generic research with broad 
application across commodities and where institutions to protect property rights 
are ineffective; (c) the main product of the research is information; and (d) the 
potential market size is limited (World Bank, 2002). 
 
In conclusion, the aim should fall on complementarity of research efforts of the 
public and private sectors (Huffman, 2001). In other words, the public sector 
must not compete with private sector efforts. 
 
3.  R&D IN THE SOUTH AFRICAN SUGAR INDUSTRY: A HISTORICAL 
PERSPECTIVE 
 
An Overseas Development Agency study (ODA, 1994) concluded that the 
agricultural research system in South Africa is probably the best equipped and 
most fundamental one in Africa. In the present study, the focus is not so much on 
the quality of R&D in South Africa, but more on the question of privatisation 
using the Sugar Industry as an example. 
 
3.1  Management of R&D in the sugar industry 
 
When the Sugar Cane Experiment Station was established in 1925, the opinion 
was that it is unsatisfactory to have scientists, however eminent, working on a 
number of crops and conversely, that it is necessary to have a number of 
scientists, of different disciplines, working on a single crop (Donovan, 1986). A 
multi-disciplinary approach was thus followed, in the sense that scientists from 
different disciplines focussed on a single objective. Research was expected to 
yield real dividends and basic research was not pursued. 
 
Early work concentrated on varieties, diseases, pests, fertilisers, soils and factory 
processes and control. The Advisory Service was added in the fifties. More than a 
third of all growers use the Fertiliser Advisory Service started in 1951, and more 
than 30,000 soil samples are tested every year. Since the mid-eighties direct 
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payment was introduced for certain services. A user charge was introduced by the 
Fertiliser Advisory Service for training courses and certain farm planning services. 
 
3.2 Research  activities   
 
The Experiment Station was initially established to screen and release new 
varieties and today that is still a major function of the Station. The variety 
programme has released more than 20 varieties for commercial production. 
Present policy is to breed varieties that are suitable for particular areas within the 
industry and which, therefore, are adapted to local conditions. 
 
The Station also conducts research into various facets of cane growing including: 
(a) the use of herbicides, pesticides and other agricultural chemicals; (b) the 
development and testing of agricultural machinery and equipment;  (c) irrigation, 
drainage and water management; (d)  nutritional requirements of sugar cane; and 
(e) the study and monitoring of pests and diseases. 
 
In addition to doing research, the Station offers the following services to growers: 
(a) training of farm workers; (b) analysis of soil and leaf samples and making 
fertiliser recommendations; and (c) courses on various aspects of cane production. 
 
The link between experimentation and commercial production of sugar cane is 
provided by extension officers. Growers can approach the extension officer for 
general advice or consult specialists at the Station on particular problems. 
 
The Station has the following departments: Agricultural Engineering, Agronomy, 
Biotechnology, Chemistry and Soils, Entomology, Farm Planning, Pathology, 
Plant Breeding, Special Projects, Extension, Biometry, Data Analysis, Human 
Resources and Training. 
 
A major function of the Station is the release of new cane varieties. Patenting of 
biological material is difficult as plants reproduce themselves with no genetic 
variation and farmers do not need to purchase new planting material every year. 
It is thus difficult to enforce patents of varieties as copying is easy and the farmer 
can multiply his own plant breeding material. The present policy of breeding 
varieties suitable for areas may limit potential private sector activities. 
 
The area of research at the Station is Managerial (agronomic technology), relevant 
to local circumstances, which is more of a public nature, although the type of 
research is more product development than basic. The area and type of research 
in the relatively minor department of agricultural engineering, appear more 
conducive to private enterprise. 
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The fact that the Sugar Industry is conducting R&D of a public goods nature, is 
because spillovers from research are internalised within the industry. Therefore, 
it does not really matter if patent rights on new sugar cane cultivars cannot be 
enforced, as all farmers benefit. The public good/private good distribution of 
R&D is thus only helpful in showing that the government should not conduct 
research on private goods (where copyrights can be enforced, etc). Commodity 
organisations still have the incentive to conduct research on a wide range of 
public goods (where copyrights cannot be enforced) as long as the group of 
farmers producing the commodity benefit. The question is then more whether the 
commodity is sold in the market and whether a levy can be charged on sales. 
 
4.  CAN EXPERIENCE AND INFORMATION BE TRANSFERRED TO 
OTHER INDUSTRIES? 
 
Few research activities in South Africa are undertaken under completely free 
market activities. Examples of the latter are the seed industry in South Africa. The 
South African Seed Industry is well developed and makes a major contribution to 
technology transfer. The return on an investment in the seed industry can be 
captured through patents and these goods are thus of a private nature. Even if 
R&D is of a public goods nature, then it still does not imply that the government 
should undertake it. In the latter case, research can be undertaken by commodity 
organisations, as for the sugar industry. Research could be funded by a levy 
imposed on producers. Consumers benefit in instances where investment in R&D 
leads to lower commodity prices and the tax payer may be required to make a 
contribution to agricultural R&D in such cases. Consumers also benefit from 
improved quality, food safety, etc.  
 
This does not imply that the government should actually do the research. The 
government can contract research out, or share in the cost of private commodity 
organisations. The latter development has taken place in the Netherlands (Dutch 
Ministry of Agriculture, 1996). The Dutch government has become more of a 
client or sponsor, paying for programmes or products, while research institutions 
are being put at a distance from government. In the past, this government was 
held responsible for developments, which were desired by society. Now the 
government confers these responsibilities as much as possible to those who have 
an interest in these developments (Dutch Ministry of Agriculture, 1996). The role 
of the government is shifting from administrator of institutions to stimulator of 
developments, which means that funding is earmarked for policy priorities. The 
Dutch R&D is also shifting away from research regarding agricultural production 
and focussing more on environmental issues. 
 
There are advantages in shifting research away from the government towards 
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commodity organisations, while the government sector is faced with several 
problems such as not responsive to clients’ needs, which is an example of a 
government failure problem (Demsetz, 1969). Changes since 1997 to National 
Science and Technology Policy in South Africa has been designed to introduce a 
greater degree of competitiveness and responsiveness to stakeholder needs. 
 
4.1  Management of R&D 
 
According to Donovan (1995a), in spite of the transfer of agricultural research 
from the government to the ARC, funding remains almost entirely with the 
government, with top-down decision making. According to an anonymous 
reviewer this situation changed significantly since the introduction of a 
competitive parliamentary grant system in 1997. Private funding for the ARC 
reached 48% of total expenditure in 2001/2002 while some ARC grain institutes 
receive over 64% of their funding from industry and private sources. This 
reviewer is of the opinion that decision making is not top down as the client 
determines what he wants to pay for. Faculties of agriculture at universities have 
traditionally conducted research on problems of commercial agriculture almost 
exclusively for higher degree purposes. Universities, however, lack extension 
staff for the transfer of information. In a commodity research programme, a 
bottom-up approach is used. In the South African Sugar Industry the policy, 
funding and management of sugar cane R&D are exclusively in the hands of the 




The South African sugar growers pay a levy of about 1.0% of the value of the crop 
to financially support their R&D package, which includes extension and training 
(Sugden, 2002). The growers themselves decide on the levy (Donovan, 1995a). A 
commodity organisation may not have a critical mass to undertake R&D. 
However, if the gross output of a commodity is too small to support R&D then 
commodities may be grouped. For levy funding to present an effective use of 
resources, it is preferable that the commodity passes through a narrow marketing 
channel, keeping collection costs to a minimum (Alston et al, 1998). Worldwide, 
only a small proportion of total R&D resources are generated through levy 
funding, in spite of the fact that financing can be made more efficient, in terms of a 
more efficient total quantity of research resources, a lower cost of raising revenues 
and greater allocative efficiency by using more industry levy funds.  
 
Evenson (1984) estimated research investment as percentage of value for 18 crops. 
The top seven crops in his study had research expenditure less than 0.5% of value 
and were grown on a commercial scale. 
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4.3 Organisational  structure 
 
The top-down decision making of R&D devoted to the commercial agricultural 
sector in South Africa is seldom appropriate under developing country 
conditions. Also, since research and extension are institutionally separated, 
different objectives and priorities are pursued (Donovan, 1995b). 
 
The problem of top-down decision-making can be solved by empowering the 
stakeholders, while the problem of inappropriate technology and its ineffective 
transfer can be solved having research and extension integrated by a common 
mission in the same R&D organisation. This can be achieved in a commodity 
(producer) R&D organisation, such as the South African Sugar Experiment 
Station.  
 
The needs and requirements of farmers in the developing sector are very different 
from large-scale commercial farmers. In the small-scale subsistence agriculture, 
problems are complex and interrelated. The organisational structure must 
depend on the needs of the stakeholders it serves. It is thus necessary to know the 
kind of farmers it is to serve and to derive a mission statement from these. 
 
In South Africa there are about 62,000 commercial farmers and 1.27 million non-
commercial producers (Bembridge, 1988). In the non-commercial sector, income 
derived from agriculture represents only about 10% of total farm income 
(Nieuwoudt & Vink, 1989), which includes wage remittances, pensions etc.  
 
In the developing agricultural sector the priority need is infrastructural 
development, the provision of water, roads, housing, etc. which could provide 
employment opportunities. Williams et al, as quoted by De Lange (1990), indicate 
that only about 20% of rural households show real interest in agriculture. These 
subsistence farmers are deficit producers (buy more food than they sell). 
Therefore a levy to fund R&D cannot be imposed on sales. The task of policy 
makers in South Africa is to maintain productivity of the commercial sector, 
develop the potential of emerging farmers while sustaining the welfare of people 
on land with low potential. 
 
4.4  Stakeholders in R&D 
 
A single organisation such as the ARC will experience a conflict of interest if it 
caters for the needs of commercial and non-commercial farmers. With a 
constrained budget, it may be inclined to give preference to fee paying 
stakeholders rather than resource poor farmers. According to Donovan (1995b), if 
the ARC were unbundled, few of its functions would remain funded and 
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controlled by government and many could and should be privatised. The theory 
of bureaucracy holds that a government R&D organisation suffers from two 
weaknesses, an incentive problem and an information problem. The incentive 
problem is a result of the fact that expected profits and losses do not provide the 
driving force for investment in a government R&D department. 
 
A government department or parastatal is a public institution and, therefore, 
political. In this regard, operations will be judged ultimately by politicians and 
not by impersonal market forces. Their political nature means that they will be 
seen to meet a variety of objectives, confounding their success. The information 
problem holds that a state research institution cannot acquire the information on 
individual preferences and production opportunities to determine the overall 
level or the pattern of R&D expenditure that would be of optimal public interest. 
Thus, because of limits on information, even the most selfless research or 
extension decision maker must choose some feasible, albeit lower-level goal, such 
as budget maximisation (Pasour, 1990). A government R&D Unit will thus follow 
a top-down approach rather than a bottom-up approach and will tend to be 
supply driven rather than demand driven. 
 
The technology transfer lag may be shorter in a commodity organisation, than 
when R&D and extension are separated. The technology transfer lag in the South 
African Sugar Experiment Station with an integrated extension service was 
estimated at only three years in this document. This compares with a 5-7 year lag 
in research organisations without integrated extension (Donovan, 1989). The 
short lag period of three years may be further explained by the fact that research 
done by the Experiment Station is of an applied nature. Furthermore, the 
education level of South African commercial farmers is relatively high. The lag 
for basic research can be expected to be long. 
 
5.  SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
Whether agricultural R&D is a private or public good depends upon whether 
developers of new technology can capture returns from investments through 
copyrights, patents or fees. If the latter is possible then R&D is a private good and 
government R&D is unwarranted and unfairly competes with commercial 
interests. 
 
Even if patents or fees are not possible (R&D a public good), then research may 
be undertaken by commodity organisations, such as in the South African Sugar 
Industry. The externalities arising from research are internalised within the 
organisation. Private incentives for research may be weaker in the case of generic 
research with broad applications across commodities. However, in the latter case 
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it will be expected that different commodity organisations will embark on joint 
projects as has happened in the past. In the case of basic research, which is often 
published in scientific journals accessible to everyone, private funding may be 
insufficient and a role is seen for the government.  
 
The issue is what can the private sector (seed company, commodity organisation) 
do better, or as well as the public sector and what can the private sector be 
encouraged to do. Sugar cane farmers pay a levy of about 1.0% of the value of the 
crop to finance their R&D package, which includes research, training and 
extension. The sugar growers decide on the amount of the levy themselves and it 
is not imposed on them from outside. A possible reason why sugar farmers agree 
to this levy is that a bottom-up research programme is followed in the sense that 
they have a direct say in how the money should be spent. 
 
It is proposed that commodity organisations in South Africa should take more 
control of management and funding of their research which appears to be the 
case. The South African government should further follow the Dutch example 
where the role of government has shifted from administrator of institutions to 
stimulator (sponsor) of research. The South African Government should thus still 
play a critical role in R&D funding in South Africa and there is concern that State 
funding has declined (Liebenberg & Kirsten, 2003).  
 
In a move towards privatisation, a bottom-up research approach is recommended 
where institutes are autonomous and only responsible to their stakeholders. The 
South African Sugar Cane Experiment Station has adopted a Systems Analysis 
Approach to research, since the Station was established, in the sense that 
scientists from different disciplines (agronomy, soil science, plant breeding, 
extension etc.) work together on a single crop. More than a third of growers use 
the Fertiliser Advisory Service and during the past decade the Station analysed 




ALSTON JM, PARDEY PG & ROSEBOOM J (1998). Financing agricultural 
research: International investment patterns and policy perspectives. World 
Development 26(6):1057-1071. 
ALSTON JM, PARDEY PG & SMITH VH (1999). Paying for agricultural 
productivity. John Hopkins University Press, Baltimore. 
ARROW KJ (1962). Economic welfare and the allocation of resources for invention. The 
rate and direction of inventive activity. Princeton University Press, Princeton, pp 
609-625. 
  240Agrekon, Vol 43, No 2 (June 2004)  Nieuwoudt & Nieuwoudt 
 
 
BEMBRIDGE TJ (1988). Considerations in technology transfer in less developed 
areas of Southern Africa. Development Southern Africa 5(2):212-226. 
DE LANGE AO (1990). A Paradigm for rural development. ADRI, Newsletter, 
September 1990. University of Fort Hare, Alice. 
DEMSETZ H (1969). Information and efficiency: Another viewpoint. Journal of 
Law and Economics 12:1-22. 
DONOVAN PA (1986). Management of agricultural research and development with 
particular reference to the Sugar Association Experiment Station. Unpublished MAgric 
Mgt Thesis, University of Natal, Pietermaritzburg. 
DONOVAN PA (1989). Returns on agricultural research and development in the South 
African Sugar Industry. Unpublished PhD Dissertation, University of Natal, 
Pietermaritzburg. 
DONOVAN PA (1995a). The management, funding and organisational structure 
of agricultural R&D in Zimbabwe, Malawi and South Africa. Part 1. Management 
and funding. Agricultural Systems 47:259-271. 
DONOVAN PA (1995b). The  management, funding and organisational structure 
of agricultural R&D in Zimbabwe, Malawi and South Africa. Part 11. 
Organisational structure. Agricultural Systems 47:273-290. 
DUTCH MINISTRY OF AGRICULTURE (1996). Knowledge policy  plan, 1995-1998. 
's-Gravenhage, The Netherlands. 
EVENSON RE (1984). Benefit and obstacles in developing appropriate technology. In: 
Eicher CK & Staatz J (ed), Agricultural Development World, John Hopkins 
University, Baltimore. 
GAY SH & NIEUWOUDT WL (2000). Influences of a free trade agreement 
between South Africa and the European Union for fresh oranges. South African 
Journal of Economic and Management Sciences 3(3):484-498. 
HUFFMAN WE (2001). Public-private R&D relationships: Discussion. American 
Journal of Agricultural Economics 83(3):754-757. 
HUFFMAN WE & JUST RE (1999). The organisation of agricultural research in 
western developed countries. Agricultural Economics 21(1):1-18. 
JAMES C (1996). Agricultural/R&D: The need for public-private sector partnerships. 
Issues in Agriculture. Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research, 
World Bank, December. 
  241Agrekon, Vol 43, No 2 (June 2004)  Nieuwoudt & Nieuwoudt 
 
 
JAMES C (2002). Progressing public-private sector partnerships in international 
agricultural R&D. International service for the acquisition of agribiotech 
applications (ISAAA). http://www.isaaa.org/publications/briefs/Brief 4.htm. 
(Accessed 14 May.) 
LIEBENBERG F & KIRSTEN J (2003). Status of agricultural research and development 
policy in South Africa. In: Nieuwoudt L &  Groenewald J (eds), The Challenge of 
Change, University of Natal Press, Pietermaritzburg. 
NIEUWOUDT WL & VINK N (1989). The effects of increased earnings from 
traditional agriculture in Southern Africa. South African Journal of Economics 57(3), 
257-269. 
OVERSEAS DEVELOPMENT AGENCY (ODA) (1994). Restructuring agricultural 
research in South Africa. Prepared by Corbett DCM, Lipton MG & Couller JK for 
the Overseas Development Agency under British Aid arrangement. 
PASOUR EC Jr (1990). Agriculture and the State. Holmes & Meier, New York. 
PERSLEY GJ (1998). Investment strategies for agriculture and natural resources. CABI 
Publishing, New York. 
RAUSER GC, DE JANVRY A, SCHMITZ A & ZILBERMAN D (1981). Principal 
issues in the evaluation of public research in agriculture. Agricultural Experiment 
Station Miscellenious Publication 8, Agricultural Station, University of 
Minnesota, pp 262-282. 
RUSIKE J (1995). An institutional analysis of the maize seed  industry in Southern 
Africa. PhD Dissertation, Department of Agricultural Economics, Michigan State 
University. 
RUTTAN VW (1982). Agricultural research policy. Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press. 
SONKA S & PUEPPKE S (2002). Exploring the public’s role in agricultural 
biotechnology research. http://www.agbioforum.org/vol2no1/sonka.html. 
(Accessed 14 May.) 
SUGDEN B (2002). Private communication. South African Cane Growers, Durban.  
TABOR SR, JANSSEN W & BRUNEAU H (1998). Financing agricultural research: A 
sourcebook: International Service for National Agricultural Research (ISNAR). 
http://www.isnar.cgiar.org/publications/books/FSB.htm. (Accessed April.) 
  242Agrekon, Vol 43, No 2 (June 2004)  Nieuwoudt & Nieuwoudt 
 
 
THIRTLE C & ECHEVERRÍA RG (1994). Privatisation and the roles of public and 
private institutions in agricultural research in Sub-Saharan Africa. Food Policy 
19(1):31-44. 
WORLD BANK (2002). Private sector research and user financing. 
http://www.worldbank.org. (Accessed 13 May.) 
 
 
  243